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This article will examine selected North Carolina contractual doc-
trines and statutory provisions in relation to their relevant counter-
parts in other jurisdictions. Particular emphasis will be placed on
those doctrinal and statutory applications that depart from the major-
ity or prevailing view. Additionally, the article will focus on the signif-
icance of developments in the law in areas where the status of a
particular doctrine is uncertain as a result of conflicting case law and
interpretation. Included in this discussion will be the doctrines of
promissory estoppel and employment "at will" which have been the
subject of recent and past debate among the judiciary and the com-
mentators with respect to the nature and scope of their application.
An in-depth examination of remedies and contractual principles
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter the "Code") is
beyond the scope of this article. Provisions in Article 2 of the Code
that regulate contracts for the sale of goods will be incorporated or
referenced only to the extent necessary to expound upon related com-
mon law concepts. Additionally, Article 9 provisions governing as-
signment and delegation are omitted from the discussion of third
party beneficiaries, and the discussion of contractual remedies is lim-
ited to an overview of general principles and significant departures in
North Carolina law from the general application of those doctrines.
CONTRACT FORMATION
Offer and Acceptance Generally
Rules of law pertaining to contract formation in North Carolina are
based primarily upon common law doctrines and are similar to those
rules applied in a majority of the jurisdictions. The essence of con-
tract formation traditionally has been characterized as a "meeting of
the minds" of the parties which is most often expressed in the form of
* Mary Wright, Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University School of Law;
B.A., 1973 University of North Carolina at Greensboro; J.D., 1976, George Washington Univer-
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an offer/promise and acceptance/promise or performance.' Whether a
party has made an offer or acceptance depends primarily on the
party's intent as it is manifested by that party's expressions and con-
duct, and the totality of the circumstances. Moreover, once it is deter-
mined that a party has made an offer, the offeror is free to revoke the
offer at any time prior to acceptance.2 This is true even where the
offeror states that the offer is to remain open for a stated period of
time. There are, however, several circumstances under which an offer
will become irrevocable such that the offeror is no longer free to re-
voke the offer, and must allow the offeree the opportunity to accept
the offer either within the stated time or within a reasonable time.
One of the most widely recognized exceptions is the option contract
which is created when consideration is given to have the offer left
open for a stated period of time.' While the courts generally will not
inquire into the adequacy of the consideration that is paid to have the
option left open, most courts that have been presented with the ques-
tion of whether consideration must, in fact, be paid in order to create
an option contract, have responded in the affirmative.4 The drafters
of the Restatement (Second), however, take the position that a writ-
ten recital of consideration may be sufficient to create an option con-
1. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §3.6 (3d ed. 1999); Yeager v. Dobbins, 114 S.E.2d
820, 823-24 (N.C. 1960) ("In the formation of a contract, an offer and acceptance are essential
elements; they constitute the agreement of the parties. The offer must be communicated, must
be complete, and must be accepted in its exact terms .... Mutuality of agreement is indispensa-
ble; the parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense ... and their minds must meet as
to all the terms.); Gregory v. Perdue, 267 S.E.2d 584 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) ("To constitute a valid
contract, parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense, and their minds must meet as
to all the terms; if any portion of the proposed terms is not settled, or no mode agreed on by
which they may be settled, there is no agreement.").
2. Winders v. Kenan, 77 S.E. 687, 689 (N.C. 1913) (citing Paddock v. Davenport, 12 S.E.
464 (N.C. 1890) ("If not based on a valuable consideration, the right to buy may be withdrawn at
any time before acceptance ....").
3. Id. (citing Cummins v. Beavers, 48 S.E. 891, 894 (Va. 1904), where the court said: "[T]he
distinction between an option given without consideration and an option given for a valuable
consideration is that in the first case it is simply an offer to sell, and can be withdrawn at any
time before acceptance upon notice to the vendee; but in the second, where a consideration is
paid for the option, it cannot be withdrawn by the vendor before the expiration of the time
specified in the option."; see also Ward v. Albertson, 81 S.E. 168, 169 (N.C. 1914).
4. See, e.g., Samonds v. Cloninger, 127 S.E. 706, 707 (N.C. 1925) (The court generally
noted that the recital of consideration in a contract was not conclusive regarding the establish-
ment of a contract.). See also Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834, 835-36 (Idaho 1980) (Where
$20.00 was recited as consideration to hold an offer open but was never paid, the court held that
the option was invalid and unenforceable.); Hermes v. William F. Meyer Co., 382 N.E.2d 841,
844-45 (II. Ct. App. 1978) (There the court held that where $1.00 was recited as consideration
but the plaintiff denied receipt of the money, the option was not supported by consideration and
was a mere offer subject to withdrawal by the plaintiff at any time before acceptance.); Ber-
ryman v. Kmoch, 559 P.2d 790, 792 (Kan. 1977) (Where the parties' agreement recited consider-
ation of $10.00 but the money was never paid, the court held that "[an option contract which is
not supported by consideration is a mere offer to sell which may be withdrawn at any time prior
to acceptance.").
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tract even if the consideration is never paid.5 Although there appears
to be North Carolina case law in support of the Restatement position,
the decision which held that the consideration was sufficient to create
an irrevocable offer even though it was not paid was one in which the
vendee had actually attempted payment by submitting a check for
$5.00 to the vendor.6 The vendor acknowledged receipt of the check
but subsequently returned it to the vendee when he changed his mind
about selling the property to the vendee. The court focused on the
question of the adequacy of the $5.00 as consideration to have the
offer left open and concluded that it was sufficient to bind the vendor.
Moreover, the court referred to the $5.00 as having been paid and
appeared to have disregarded the vendor's attempt to reject payment
by returning the check.7 Thus, Ward is not representative of the more
typical case in which there is no attempt made to provide the consid-
eration recited in the parties' instrument. In addition to a recital of
the $5.00, the option in Ward was also under seal, and the court noted
that an agreement to hold an offer open for the time specified, if sup-
ported by consideration or a seal, constitutes an irrevocable offer to
sell.8 Consequently, the court was possibly influenced by the presence
of the seal being sufficient to hold the offer open in the absence of
consideration. In general, the acceptance of the seal as a substitute
for consideration for an option is widely recognized under North Car-
olina case law,9 and while the courts will not inquire behind the seal in
an action at law for damages, where the party is seeking equitable
relief, the courts will go behind the seal and refuse to enforce the
agreement unless the seal is supported by consideration.1"
Oftentimes, instruments containing a recital of money as considera-
tion to have an offer left open will also include a general recital in
which the offeror agrees that she will hold the offer open based upon
the money and "other valuable consideration." Accordingly, where
the money has not been paid, the offeree will contend that some per-
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1981) ("An offer is binding as an option
contract if it.. is in writing and signed by the offeror, recites a purported consideration for the
making of the offer, and proposes an exchange on fair terms within a reasonable time ......
(emphasis added).
6. Ward, 81 S.E. at 169.
7. See, e.g., Buffaloe v. Hart, 441 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (The court disagreed
with the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's delivery of a check to the defendant did not
constitute partial payment because the defendant never legally accepted the plaintiffs check and
held that where the plaintiff delivered a check to the defendant on October 22nd and the defen-
dant did not return the check to plaintiff until October 26th, one could reasonably conclude that
the defendant accepted payment under the terms and conditions of the parties' contract.).
8. Id.
9. Cruthis v. Steele, 131 S.E.2d 344, 346 (N.C. 1963); Samonds, 127 S.E. at 707; Craig v.
Kessing, 244 S.E.2d 721, 723 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978).
10. Craig, 244 S.E.2d at 724.
2004]
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formance on the part of the offeree serves as the "other valuable con-
sideration." In Craig v. Kessing where the money recited in the
instrument was not paid, and the plaintiff asserted that his efforts to
obtain a buyer for the property constituted consideration for the de-
fendant's promise to hold the offer, the court agreed that there was
sufficient evidence in the record to support plaintiff's position that his
efforts constituted consideration." The outcome of these cases is
largely dependent upon whether the court finds that the actions of the
party seeking enforcement were sought by the other party, or whether
the party's actions simply constituted unbargained-for reliance.
Where the court finds that the actions were not bargained for, the
enforcement of the parties' agreement will turn on the court's willing-
ness to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel.12
A second exception to the general rule that an offer is revocable at
any time prior to acceptance applies to contracts for the sale of goods.
This exception provides that where a merchant states in a signed writ-
ing that the offer will remain open, the merchant must hold the offer
open for the time stated or for a reasonable time not to exceed three
months.13 A third exception which pertains to unilateral contracts
provides that where the offeror seeks a performance from the offeree,
the tender or beginning of performance by the offeree results in the
creation of an option contract. 4 The offeror can no longer withdraw
the offer, but must give the offeree the opportunity to complete the
performance either within the time stated or within a reasonable time.
Although this exception has generally met with approval,15 there is no
case law reflecting an explicit adoption of the Restatement provision
by the North Carolina courts. On the contrary, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals in White v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital reit-
erated its position that an offeror is free to revoke her offer at any
time where the offeror is seeking a performance from the offeree
when it said: "As is deducible from the foregoing, the distinctive fea-
tures of an [sic] unilateral contract are that the offeror is the master of
11. Id. at 723-24.
12. See, e.g., Berryman v. Kmoch, 559 P.2d 790, 793-794 (Kan. 1977) (There the court re-
jected the appellant's argument that the option contract should be enforceable under the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel where the appellant had spent time, effort and money attempting to
interest other investors in the property.).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-205 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.). John D. Wladis,
The Contract Formation Sections of the Proposed Revisions to U. C. C. Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV.
997, 1003 (2001) (2-205 revised to substitute "authenticated record" for "signed writing" and
"form record" for "form" to reflect current electronic commerce.).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45(1) (1981) ("Where an offer invites an
offeree to accept by rendering a performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, an
option contract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance or tenders
a beginning of it ... ").
15. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.24.
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his offer and can withdraw it at any time before it is accepted by per-
formance .... ."' Under this application of the traditional view of a
unilateral contract, however, North Carolina courts have held that
where the offeree has fully performed prior to a revocation of the
offer, the offeree is entitled to performance by the offeror. 17
Employment "At Will" Doctrine
North Carolina is among those jurisdictions that continue to adhere
to the employment "at will" doctrine which provides that in the ab-
sence of an employment contract for a definite period, the employee
and employer are free to terminate their association at any time and
for any reason.18 The employment "at will" doctrine, however, is sub-
ject to certain state and federal statutes that prohibit retaliatory and
discriminatory terminations.19 The North Carolina Equal Employ-
ment Practices Act, for example, sets forth the following:
16. White v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., 387 S.E.2d 80, 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
17. Id. (The court held that the statement in defendant hospital's personnel handbook was
evidence of an offer to make insurance available to employees who met the stated conditions
and that the offer had not been withdrawn before the employee met those conditions.); see also
Roberts v. Mays Mills, Inc., 114 S.E. 530 (N.C. 1922) (employer's promise to pay a bonus to all
employees who remained continuously employed until Christmas held to be enforceable);
Brooks v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 290 S.E.2d 370, 372 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)(an employee's
lawsuit for severance benefits was not dismissible because the employer did not withdraw its
offer of the benefits before the employee met the conditions even though the employer could
have done so).
18. Still v. Lance, 182 S.E.2d 403 (N.C. 1971).
19. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (WESTLAW through P.L. 108-444 approved Dec.
3, 2004) ("It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to. . . discharge any
individual.. because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .. " ); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 95-83 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.) ("Any person who may
be... deprived of continuation of his employment in violation of G.S. 95-80, 95-81 or 95-82
[prohibiting an employer from denying an employee the opportunity to participate in organized
labor activities or requiring an employee to participate in such activities as a condition of em-
ployment] ... shall be entitled to recover from such employer ... such damages as he may have
sustained by reason of such ... deprivation of employment .. "); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-5
(WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess. ) ("It is a discriminatory practice for an employer to ...
discharge or otherwise discriminate against a qualified person with a disability on the basis of a
disabling condition .... ); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-241(WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.)
which provides, in part, as follows:
(a) No person shall discriminate or take any retaliatory action against an employee because
the employee in good faith does or threatens to do any of the following:
(1) File a claim or complaint, initiate any inquiry, investigation, inspection, proceeding or
other action, or testify or provide information to any person with respect to any of the
following:
a. Chapter 97 of the General Statutes
b. Article 2A or Article 16 of this chapter
c. Article 2A of Chapter 74 of the General Statutes
d. G.S. 95-28.1
e. Article 16 of Chapter 127A of the General Statutes
f. G.S. 95-128.1A
(2) Cause any of the activities listed in subdivision (1) of this subsection to be initiated on
an employee's behalf
5
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It is the public policy of this State to protect and safeguard the right
and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain and hold employment
without discrimination or abridgement on account of race, religion,
color, national origin, age, sex or handicap by employers which regu-
larly employ 15 or more employees ....
In addition to statutory restrictions on the employment "at will"
relationship, employee handbooks may also potentially impose limita-
tions on the relationship. In the absence of consideration independent
from performance of the job by the employee, however, most courts
historically have held that employee handbooks are unilateral state-
ments by the employer that are unenforceable based on lack of con-
sideration or lack of mutuality of obligation. 1 In recent years, some
courts have begun to depart from this posture and decisions evince an
inclination to take a more liberal approach towards the incorporation
of the employee handbook into the "at will" employment contract.
At least one North Carolina court has held that the application of the
employment "at will" doctrine can be restricted by employee manuals
which place limitations on the circumstances under which an em-
ployee may be terminated. In Trought v. Richardson, where the em-
ployee alleged that she was required to sign a statement at the
beginning of her employment that she had read the hospital policy
manual, the North Carolina Court of Appeals concluded the em-
ployee had sufficiently alleged that the policy manual was a part of her
employment contract to survive a motion to dismiss.22 The manual
provided that she could be discharged only for cause, and set forth
procedures that the hospital was required to follow. 23 The next year,
however, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Harris v. Duke Power
distinguished Trought and found that the employment manual in Har-
ris provided rules of conduct that were directed towards management
rather than the employees and that the employee in that case, unlike
the employee in Trought, had not been told he could be discharged
only "for cause. In so doing, the court followed a line of decisions
in the state in which the courts have refused to find that an employee
(3) Exercise any right on behalf of the employee or any other employee afforded by Article
2A or Article 16 of this Chapter or by Article 2A of Chapter 74 of the General Statutes
(4) Comply with the provisions of Article 27 of Chapter 7B of the General Statutes ....
See also Andrew B. Cohen, Wrongful Discharge and the North Carolina Equal Employment
Practices Act: The Localization of Federal Discrimination Law, 21 N.C. CErr. L.J. 54 (1995).
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.).
21. Richard Harrison Winters, Employee Handbooks and Employment-at-Will Contracts,
1985 DUKE L.J. 196, 201.
22. Trought v. Richardson, 338 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
23. Id. at 619.
24. Harris v. Duke Power Co., 356 S.E.2d 357 (N.C. 1987), overruled on other grounds, 493
S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 1997).
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handbook becomes part of an "at will" employment contract.25 Al-
though these courts have consistently held that the employee hand-
book must "expressly" be incorporated into the employment contract,
the decisions provide no definitive guidance on the type of conduct
that will satisfy the requirement of "express" incorporation.26 In Salt
v. Applied Analytical, Inc., the North Carolina Court of Appeals ap-
peared to retreat from the position it had taken in Trought when it
found that the employee manual was "neither inflexible nor all-inclu-
sive" with respect to termination procedures.27 The court went on to
conclude that although the manual was presented as the employee's
"work bible" when he was hired, it was not expressly included within
his "at will" contract.28 The distinctions pointed out by the court,
however, are unconvincing, and the decisions appear to be more re-
flective of a retrenchment by the court from its earlier inclination to
align itself with the recent trends in this area.
Winters, for example, points out in his article that more courts, in
general, are beginning to find that employee handbooks contain en-
forceable rights, and that the application of the unilateral contract rule
is supportive of an outcome favoring the enforcement of employee
handbooks.29 Winters' position is premised on the analytical frame-
work of a unilateral contract which accomplishes two objectives. In
the first instance, the presumption under a unilateral contract analysis
is that the employer is offering the handbook as an incentive for the
employee to remain on the job. Thus the employee's continuation of
employment would constitute the performance sought by the em-
ployer in exchange for the promises contained in the employee hand-
book; under this construct, consideration is no longer an issue.
Moreover, since the unilateral contract is an exception to the require-
ment of mutuality of obligation, the argument that no enforceable
contract results, because the employer is bound by the constraints in
25. See generally, Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 335 S.E.2d 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985),
disc. review denied, 341 S.E.2d 39 (N.C. 1986).; Smith v. Monsanto Corp., 322 S.E.2d 611 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1984) (company policy manual was not incorporated into the employment contract);
Griffin v. Housing Authority, 303 S.E.2d 200 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); see also Winters, supra note
21.
26. Walker, 335 S.E.2d at 83-84 (Where the employee, shortly after beginning employment,
received a copy of an employee handbook, the court said "[i]t is clear that unilaterally promul-
gated employment manuals or policies do not become part of the employment contract unless
expressly included in it .... "); Griffin, 303 S.E.2d at 201 (employer's personnel manual was not
expressly incorporated into the employment contract.).
27. Walker, 335 S.E.2d at 100.
28. Id. at 99-100 (The employee testified that she was given a copy of the personnel manual
at the beginning of her employment and that she was required to sign a statement verifying
receipt of the manual. She further stated that employees were required to sign periodic verifica-
tions acknowledging they had read revisions to the manual.).
29. Winters, supra note 21, at 205.
2004]
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the handbook while the employee remains free to terminate the rela-
tionship at will, is greatly diminished.
Notwithstanding their restrictive treatment of employee handbooks,
North Carolina courts, like those in other jurisdictions that continue
to adhere to the employment "at will" doctrine, appear to have carved
out other exceptions that lessen the impact the doctrine has on em-
ployment relationships. The courts' movement in this direction, how-
ever, has been fraught with difficulty and uncertainty. In Coman v.
Thomas Manufacturing Co., the North Carolina Supreme Court rec-
ognized wrongful discharge in an "at will" employment relationship
when it said that discharging an employee for refusing to falsify driver
records to show compliance with federal transportation regulations of-
fended public policy.3" Prior to Coman, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that an employee had stated an enforceable claim
against the defendant employer for wrongful discharge where she al-
leged that she was dismissed in retaliation for refusing to commit per-
jury on the employer's behalf.3"
In Sides where the employee further alleged that assurances by the
employer that she would only be discharged for incompetence in-
duced her to move from Michigan to North Carolina to accept the
position, the court also applied the "moving residence" exception to
the employment "at will" relationship.32 Earlier in Burkhimer v.
Gealy, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, citing Tuttle v. Kerners-
ville Lumber Co., had said that "[w]here an employee gives some spe-
cial consideration in addition to his services, such as ... removing his
residence from one place to another in order to accept employment
.. such a contract may be enforced .... ."33 In Harris v. Duke Power,
the North Carolina Supreme Court had also recognized the "moving
residence" exception although it did not apply it in that case.34 Ten
years after Harris, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in
Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., disavowed any adop-
tion by that court of the "moving residence" exception to the employ-
ment "at will" doctrine.35 The court acknowledged that while it had
made mention of the "moving residence" exception in Harris, it was
part of a background discussion, and not the basis upon which that
case was decided. The court further clarified its current position by
30. Coman v. Thomas Mfg., 381 S.E.2d 445, 448 (N.C. 1989) ("Our decision today is in
accord with the holdings of most jurisdictions. About four-fifths of the states now recognize
some form of cause of action for wrongful discharge."); Cohen, supra note 19.
31. Sides v. Duke Univ., 328 S.E.2d 818, 826-27 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
32. Id. at 828.
33. Burkhimer v. Gealy, 250 S.E.2d 678, 682 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
34. Harris v. Duke Power Co., 356 S.E.2d 357, 359 (N.C. 1987), overruled on other grounds,
493 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 1997).
35. Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., 493 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 1997).
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stating that it had neither approved nor disapproved the "moving resi-
dence" exception and that any language in Harris viewed as sug-
gesting the contrary was expressly disapproved. It added that the
pertinent language from the court of appeals' opinions in Burkhimer
and Sides was also disapproved. 36 Krupnow's article, Employee Be-
ware-Relocation Does Not Remove the Presumption of Employment-
at-Will: Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., provides a de-
tailed history of the development of the "moving residence" exception
and the author notes that while the court in Kurtzman claimed the
"moving residence" exception was 'largely clear,' there has been disa-
greement among the courts on this exception. 37 She concludes, how-
ever, that the continued viability of the "moving residence" exception
following Kurtzman is doubtful at best.3"
Reliance on Offers in Bilateral Contracts
Although courts generally reacted favorably to the Restatement's
provision creating an irrevocable offer based upon reliance on an of-
fer seeking performance in the context of unilateral contracts, jurisdic-
tions are split on the question of whether reliance on an offer seeking
a return promise in the context of a bilateral contract should create an
irrevocable offer.39 Since both parties are bound under a bilateral
contract upon their exchange of promises, these contracts, in general,
do not give rise to the same concerns as unilateral contracts. Unlike
the promisee under a unilateral contract for whom performance is ac-
ceptance, the promisee under the bilateral contract is (or can be) pro-
tected at the time she begins her performance. Nonetheless, there are
certain circumstances that arise in the context of a bilateral contract
when it is necessary for the offeree to rely upon the offer prior to
acceptance. These circumstances most commonly involve construc-
tion contracts where a general contractor must rely upon the subcon-
tractor's bid in submitting its own bid. Where the subcontractor
attempts to revoke its bid after the general contractor has used the
subcontractor's bid in its overall bid for a project, the general contrac-
36. Id. at 423.
37. Mary McCrory Krupnow, Employee Beware-Relocation Does Not Remove the Pre-
sumption of Employment-at-Will: Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., 76 N.C. L.
REV. 2423, 2432 (1998).
38. Id. at 2438.
39. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (There the court enunciated
the position that reliance of a general contractor on a bid submitted by a subcontractor does not
result in the creation of an option contract, requiring the subcontractor to leave its offer open
absent some agreement to the contrary by the parties.); contra Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333
P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (In this case, the court held that reliance by a general contractor on a
subcontractor's bid would result in making the subcontractor's offer irrevocable for a reasonable
period of time following reliance by the general contractor.).
20041
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tor may argue that its reliance on the subcontractor's bid should result
in an irrevocable offer. Under the application of this theory of prom-
issory estoppel, the subcontractor would be unable to revoke the offer
until the general contractor has had a reasonable opportunity to ac-
cept the offer. While the majority of the courts that have considered
this question have held that under these circumstances an irrevocable
offer is created, a ° North Carolina courts have taken the position that
reliance under such circumstances does not form a basis for creating
an irrevocable offer." Although North Carolina courts accept promis-
sory estoppel as a substitute for consideration under certain circum-
stances, in Home Electric Co. v. Hall, the court refused to recognize a
cause of action based on promissory estoppel to bind a subcontractor
to its bid based upon the general contractor's reliance on that bid.42
The rationale for the court's decision was based partly upon its con-
cern for the unfairness that would result where the application of
promissory estoppel would bind the subcontractor while leaving the
general contractor free to shop around for lower bids.
The "Mirror Image" Rule
North Carolina case law is consistent with the general rule of law
with respect to acceptance of an offer in that it provides that the ac-
ceptance must be unequivocal.4 3 It should be noted, however, that
while the common law "mirror image" rule provides that any devia-
tion from the offer results in a counteroffer, North Carolina is among
those jurisdictions that interpret the "mirror image" rule as requiring
that the change in the offer be material in order for the purported
acceptance to result in a counteroffer. The court has held that a provi-
sion for the inclusion of additional details to be agreed upon by the
parties at a later time will not prevent a response from constituting a
valid acceptance. In Carver v. Britt, where the vendor of real property
stated that he accepted an offer to purchase property "subject to de-
tails to be worked out" by the vendee and the vendor's attorney, the
court held that such a provision did not result in a counteroffer.4 4 On
the other hand, where the offeree's response extends beyond the addi-
tion of mere details, the response results in a counteroffer and pre-
40. CALAMARI AND PERILLO, CONTRACFS § 6.5 (3d ed. 1987).
41. Home Elec. Co. v. Hall, 358 S.E.2d 539 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
42. Id. at 542 (The court noted that general contractors could protect themselves by secur-
ing a contract with the subcontractor at the outset conditioned on a successful bid.); Janine
McPeters Murphy, Note, Promissory Estoppel: Subcontractor's Liability in Construction Bidding
Cases, 63 N.C. L. REV. 387 (1985); Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32
WILLIAMEI-FE L. REV. 263 (1996).
43. Carver v. Britt, 85 S.E.2d 888 (N.C. 1955).
44. Id. at 890.
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vents the formation of a contract.45 Where the subject matter of the
parties' transaction is goods, such that the transaction is governed by
the provisions of the Code, the common law "mirror image" rule will
not apply, and terms contained in the offeree's response that vary
from the offer will not prevent the response from constituting an ac-
ceptance, provided that the requirements of Section 2-207 are met.46
Consideration
To the extent that a contract is said to consist of an agreement be-
tween parties that has a legal effect, a fundamental requirement for
the legal effect is consideration.4 ' Historically, the "benefit detri-
ment" theory provided that the requirement of consideration for the
formation of a contract was satisfied by a detriment by the promisee
or a benefit to the promisor.48 Today, however, most jurisdictions ap-
ply the "bargain" theory of consideration which states that the prom-
isor must seek a promise or performance from the promisee in
exchange for the promisor's promise, and the promisee, in turn, must
provide a promise or return performance in exchange for the prom-
isor's promise. 49 North Carolina case law appears to adopt the "bar-
gain" theory of consideration while continuing to embrace the
45. Richardson v. Greensboro Warehouse and Storage Co., 26 S.E.2d 897, 898-89 (N.C.
1943); See also Rucker v. Sanders, 109 S.E. 857 (N.C. 1921).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-207(1) (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.) ("A definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance ... which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms."); Mark E. Roszkowski, Revised Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Section-
by-Section Analysis, 54 SMU L. REV. 927, 932 (2001) (Revised § 2-207 provides that if (i) con-
duct by both parties recognizes the existence of a contract although their records do not other-
wise establish a contract, (ii) a contract is formed by an offer and acceptance, or (iii) a contract
formed in any manner is confirmed by a record that contains terms additional to or different
from those in the contract being confirmed then the term4, of the contract are: (1) terms that
appear in the records of both parties; (2) terms, whether in a record or not, to which both parties
agree; and (3) terms supplied or incorporated under any provision of the Uniform Commercial
Code.).
47. In re Owen, 303 S.E.2d 351, 353 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) ("Consideration is the glue that
binds the parties to a contract together.").
48. Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (A landmark case based on the "benefit
detriment" theory of consideration in which an uncle promised to give his nephew $5,000 if the
nephew refrained from drinking, smoking, swearing and participating in various other vices until
the nephew was 21 years of age. The court held that the nephew suffered a legal detriment even
if the nephew actually benefited from not engaging in these activities and therefore there was
consideration for the uncle's promise of the $5,000.).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981 ) ("[T]o constitute consideration, a
performance or a return promise must be bargained for .... A performance or return promise is
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the
promisee in exchange for that promise .... ).
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"benefit detriment" theory.5" In Chemical Realty Corp. v. Home Fed.
Savings and Loan Ass'n, the court had the following to say:
[C]onsideration sufficient to support a contract.., consists of any ben-
efit right, or interest bestowed upon the promisor or any forbearance,
detriment or loss undertaken by a promisee .... Moreover, the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1979) provides, in pertinent
part, that... to constitute consideration, a performance or a return
promise must be bargained for ...... "Bargained for" in this context
means ... the consideration induces the making of the promise and
the promise induces the furnishing of the consideration. Both ele-
ments must be present or there is no bargain ....
Practically speaking, there is no significant difference between the
two theories in that the "benefit detriment" theory necessarily in-
volves a bargaining element and the "bargain" theory, likewise, in-
volves a detriment. Although, in Hamer, the landmark "benefit
detriment" case, where the discussion focused on whether the nephew
had suffered a detriment, the application of the "bargain" theory to
Hamer would yield the same result inasmuch as the uncle had sought
a performance from the nephew in exchange for his promise of the
money, and the nephew in turn, had refrained from participating in
the named activities, in exchange for the uncle's promise of the
money.
A particular application of the doctrine of consideration in North
Carolina is the non-compete agreement. Where an employee enters
into an agreement with the employer at the beginning of the employ-
ment contract, courts generally do not have any difficulty finding that
consideration exists for the non-compete agreement since the em-
ployer, in this instance, seeks a promise from the employee not to
compete against the employer following termination of her employ-
ment in exchange for the employer's promise to hire the employee.
However, where the employee enters into a covenant not to compete
with the employer subsequent to the formation of the employment
contract, courts differ on whether the employee's continued employ-
ment with the employer is consideration for the employee's promise
50. Clark Trucking v. Lee Paving Co., 426 S.E.2d 288 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (The court ratio-
nalized that the subcontractor suffers no detriment when it submits bids to the general contrac-
tor and therefore there is no consideration to support an implied promise between the two
parties.); Chemical Realty Corp. v. Home Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 351 S.E.2d 786 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1987); see also Carolina Helicopter v. Cutter Realty Co., 139 S.E.2d 362, 368 (N.C. 1964)
("[C]onsideration consists of some benefit or advantage to the promisor, or some loss or detri-
ment to the promisee .. "); Mills v. Bonin, 80 S.E.2d 365, 367 (N.C. 1954) ("As a general rule
the term consideration as affecting the enforceability of contracts, consists of some benefit or
advantage to the promisor or some loss or detriment to the promisee .. "); Wolfe v. Eaker, 272
S.E.2d 781 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Albemarle Educ. Found. v. Basnight, 167 S.E.2d 486 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1969); Holmes, supra note 42, at 431-32.
51. Chemical Realty Corp. at 788-89.
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 [2004], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol27/iss1/4
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
not to compete. North Carolina courts have held that where the cove-
nant not to compete is entered into after the employment contract,
there is no consideration for the employee's promise not to compete
unless the employee receives a new benefit such as a promotion or a
raise. 2 Mere continuation of employment by the employee following
the non-compete agreement is not consideration based on the court's
assumption that the employment relationship would have continued
absent the covenant not to compete. 3
Promissory Estoppel
Where a party fails to establish the "bargain" or the "benefit detri-
ment" necessary to support a finding of consideration, an alternate
basis for relief may lie in the application of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. Historically, the most common application of promissory es-
toppel was in the family or social context where gratuitous promises
were most often made. The common law development of the doctrine
of promissory estoppel represented an expansion of the doctrine of
equitable estoppel to apply to situations where a gratuitous promise
was detrimentally relied upon and enforcement under the doctrine of
consideration was unavailable because of a lack of the bargaining ele-
ment. The Restatement later incorporated a promissory estoppel pro-
vision which essentially provides that where the promisor should
reasonably expect that a promisee will detrimentally rely upon her
promise, the promise will be enforceable to the extent that justice re-
quires.54 While the promissory estoppel doctrine had its inception in
the family/social context, the courts later extended its application to
the commercial setting. Although North Carolina, like most jurisdic-
tions, recognizes the doctrine of promissory estoppel 5 5 the North Car-
olina Court of Appeals expressly declined to adopt Section 90 of the
52. Mastrom, Inc. v. Warren, 196 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973).
53. Id. at 530; Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548 (N.C. 1944) (The court noted that while
continued employment is ordinarily viewed as sufficient consideration for a covenant not to
compete, it was unwilling to so find where the contract containing the negative covenant was
extracted from the employee after the employee had been employed for several years and the
nature of his duties and the business thereafter remained the same.); see also James C. Greene
Co. v. Kelley, 134 S.E.2d 166, 167 (N.C. 1964) (Citing Kadis v. Brit with approval, the court held
that when the relationship of employer/employee is established without a restrictive covenant,
any agreement thereafter not to compete must be in the form of a new contract with new
consideration.).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981)("A promise which the prom-
isor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise ... .
55. Holmes, supra note 42, at 430.
2004]
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Restatement (Second) that permits a third party to assert her reliance
on a gratuitous promise. 6
Moreover, the manner and the extent to which the doctrine has
evolved in North Carolina has been the subject of debate. In Wacho-
via Bank & Trust v. Rubish, the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that the defendant in that case could use promissory estoppel as a
defense to a summary ejectment action by proving the plaintiff's ex-
press or implied promise to waive a written notice provision of the
lease and the defendant's reliance on that promise. 7 The Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals subsequently relied upon Wachovia Bank &
Trust when it enunciated its holding in Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Vir-
ginia Metal Industries, Inc.58 The court, relying upon the Wachovia
Bank and Trust decision, opined that North Carolina courts would
have applied traditional promissory estoppel on the facts of Campbell.
However, in Campbell, the Fourth Circuit expanded the scope of
promissory estoppel in that the doctrine had been applied defensively
in Wachovia Bank & Trust, whereas the doctrine was used affirma-
tively in Campbell. Following the Campbell decision, the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals used Home Electric Co. v. Hall & Underdown
Heating & Air Conditioning Co. as an opportunity to explicate its po-
sition on the application of promissory estoppel when it said:
North Carolina Courts have recognized to a limited extent the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel, but have not expressly recognized it in
all situations. Furthermore, our Courts have never recognized it as a
substitute for consideration, either in construction bidding, or in any
other context. The North Carolina cases which have applied the doc-
trine have done so in a defensive situation, where there has been an
intended abandonment of an existing right by the promisee. North
Carolina case law has not approved the doctrine of affirmative
relief.59
The court emphasized that Wachovia Bank and Trust was distin-
guishable on its facts from Home Electric. It further concluded that
Campbell was not binding precedent and therefore it was not obli-
gated to rely upon that decision. As the case law now stands, a federal
court applying what it construed to be North Carolina law permitted
the affirmative application of promissory estoppel in a construction
bidding context. The intermediate state court, however, has since lim-
56. Lee v. Paragon Group Contractors, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 132 (N.C. Ct. App.1985) (After
comparing section 90 of the Restatement and the Restatement (Second), the court declined to
adopt the "third party" provision in the Restatement (Second) and held that only the promisee
may assert promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration.).
57. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Rubish, 293 S.E.2d 749 (N.C. 1982).
58. Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Va. Metal Indus., 708 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1983).
59. Home Electric Co. v. Hall & Underdown Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 358 S.E.2d
539, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
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ited the doctrine to a defensive application in the context of construc-
tion bidding, with an indication that, contrary to the Campbell
decision, North Carolina courts have not approved the affirmative use
of the doctrine under any circumstances. Until the North Carolina
Supreme Court addresses this issue, the matter will remain
unresolved.60
The Seal and Restitution in the Absence of Consideration
Historically, another basis upon which a promise was enforceable in
the absence of consideration was a promise made under seal. It was
generally agreed that the formality of the seal served as an adequate
substitute for consideration. However, as the formality of the seal was
eroded, most jurisdictions abolished the use of the seal as a substitute
for consideration, either by statute or by judicial decisions. Notably,
there is no statute in North Carolina purporting to abolish the seal for
all transactions and to make it inoperative.6" To the contrary, there is
case law that supports the continued efficacy of the seal.62 Moreover,
there is statutory law that speaks to sealed instruments. 63 Notwith-
standing the preceding, with respect to contracts for the sale of goods,
North Carolina enacted Section 2-203 of the Code which states that
"[t]he affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a contract for sale or an
offer to buy or sell goods does not constitute the writing a sealed in-
strument and the law with respect to sealed instruments does not ap-
ply to such a contract or offer."'64 Additionally, in those instances in
which the court continues to recognize the validity of the seal, the
formality and import of the seal have been diminished to the point
that the court has been able to find that the mere presence of the
word "seal" is sufficient to qualify the contract as a sealed
instrument.65
60. Murphy, supra note 42, at 402; Holmes, supra note 42, at 429-31.
61. Eric Mills Holmes, Stature and Status of a Promise Under Seal as a Legal Formality, 29
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 617, 639-41 n.58 (1993); Joel S. Jenkins, Jr., Comment, The Seal in North
Carolina and the Need for Reform, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 251 (1979).
62. Cameron v. Martin Marietta Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D.N.C. 1990); Allsbrook v.
Walston, 193 S.E. 151 (N.C. 1937); Garrison v. Blakeney, 246 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978);
Craig v. Kessing, 244 S.E.2d 721, 724 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (A seal raises a presumption of
consideration that must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. If a party is seeking
equitable relief, however, the court will go behind the seal and refuse to enforce the contract
unless it is supported by actual consideration); Samonds v. Cloninger, 127 S.E. 706, 707 (N.C.
1925) ("[A]n option under seal requires no consideration to support it ....").
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-47(2) (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.) (the statute of limi-
tations for a sealed instrument is 10 years.).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-203 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.); Roszkowski, supra
note 46 at 931 (§ 2-203 substantially unchanged).
65. Cameron, 729 F. Supp. at 1530-31.
2004]
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As with the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the doctrines of resti-
tution and promissory restitution may be invoked where a promise or
performance can give rise to questions of enforcement in a transaction
that lacks the bargaining element required for the creation of a con-
tract under the theory of consideration. The doctrine of restitution is
premised upon the equitable principle that a party who is unjustly en-
riched by the services of another should be obligated to compensate
that party for the reasonable value of her services even though the
services were unrequested. In Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. David G.
Allen Co., where the plaintiff delivered crushed stone to the defen-
dant who used the stone in a construction project, the court deter-
mined that while there was no express contract between the parties,
the actions of the parties gave rise to a quasi-contract.66
A particular application of the doctrine of restitution can arise in
the context of a transaction where a subcontractor has contracted with
a general contractor to supply goods or services to an owner of real
property. Where the general contractor fails to pay the subcontractor,
the subcontractor will often seek payment from the owner of the
property. At common law, the subcontractor sought recovery on the
grounds that the owner of the property would be unjustly enriched if
allowed to retain the benefits of the services without compensating
that party. The cases generally turned on whether the owner had paid
the general contractor for the work since the owner, under those cir-
cumstances, would not be unjustly enriched even though the recipient
of the payment was not the party who actually rendered the services.
The majority of jurisdictions, including North Carolina, have en-
acted mechanics' lien statutes which are intended to provide a remedy
for subcontractors who comply with the statutory mandates.67 While
such statutes, in theory, are based upon the equitable doctrine of resti-
tution, in actuality, the ability of the subcontractor to recover under
such statutes depends, not upon whether the owner would otherwise
be unjustly enriched, but upon whether the subcontractor complies
with the procedural requirements of the statute. Consequently, under
a mechanics' lien statute, an owner could be required to pay twice for
services rendered. This potential liability has given rise to the use of
lien waivers where the owner requires the general contractor to pre-
sent waivers signed by subcontractors prior to the release of funds to
the general contractor.
66. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. David G. Allen Co., 206 S.E.2d 750, 752 (N.C. Ct. App.
1974) (The court articulated the general rule that where services of a character usually charged
for are rendered by one person for another and knowingly and voluntarily accepted, the law
presumes the services were given with the expectation of payment and implies a promise to pay
the reasonable value of the services.).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-13 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.).
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Restitution can also arise where the recipient of an unrequested ser-
vice subsequently promises to compensate the provider of the service
but later reneges on the promise. The modern view as espoused in
Webb v. McGowin is that the promisor may be legally liable on the
subsequent promise if the promisor received a material benefit.68 In
that case, the owner of a company whose life was saved by an em-
ployee, subsequently promised to provide the employee financial as-
sistance for the remainder of the employee's life. After the owner's
death, the estate refused to pay the employee, and the court held that
the estate was liable because of the material benefit that the owner
received even though the act was done without the owner's request.
69
This decision was subsequently codified in the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts which states that "[a] promise made in recognition of a
benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee is
binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice . "..."70 The more
traditional view, however, is that while the subsequent promise sub-
jects the promisor to a moral obligation, it does not result in a legal
obligation.71 North Carolina's adherence to the traditional view was
expressed in Hatchell v. Odom.7 2 In that case, the vendor of a captive/
enslaved African promised the vendee that if the captive/enslaved Af-
rican was found to be unsound, he would either cure the individual or
refund the purchase price that had been paid for him.73 When the
vendor was subsequently sued for refusing to repay the purchase price
upon a determination that the captive/enslaved African was ill, the
court ironically noted that while the vendor could not, in good con-
science, keep the price paid for a person found to be unsound, the
obligation of restitution resided only in the vendor's conscience, and
not in the law:
[A] promise, however, express, must be regarded as a nude pact, and
not binding in law, if founded solely on consideration, which the law
holds altogether insufficient to create a legal obligation .... If we
68. Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 199 (Ala. 1936).
69. Id. at 199-200.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981) (This provision goes on to state
that the promise is not binding if the promisee conferred the benefit as a gift or to the extent that
the value of the promise is disproportionate to the benefit received.).
71. See, e.g., Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass.(3 Pick.) 207 (1825) (Where a father promised to
compensate a person who provided unrequested medical assistance his adult child, the court
held that the father was morally obligated on his gratuitous promise but that he was not legally
obligated on the promise.).
72. Hatchell v. Odom, 19 N.C. 302, 1837 WL 441, at *1 (2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 1837); see also
Harrington v. Taylor, 36 S.E.2d 227 (N.C. 1945) (Where a party, in the process of deflecting an
axe that was intended to strike another, was injured and subsequently promised by that party
that he would pay for her injuries, the court held in a lawsuit brought by the injured party that,
although the defendant should be compelled by a moral obligation to pay, there was no consid-
eration that would require him to compensate the plaintiff.).
73. Hatchell, 19 N.C. at 305.
20041
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dismiss, as not constituting a sufficient consideration for the promise
of the intestate, the supposed moral obligation incumbent upon him to
remunerate the plaintiff for his unexpected loss, we can see in neither
count of the declaration, any other matters averred constituting such a
consideration.74
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT
The Parol Evidence Rule
Assuming that the basic requirements of the formation of a contract
are satisfied, the nature of the parties' agreement can still be a source
of dispute. Consequently, the courts may be called upon to interpret
the parties' agreement in order to ascertain the inclusion and meaning
of terms that relate to the parties' performance obligations. The ex-
tent to which certain terms are included in the parties' agreement may
be impacted by the parol evidence rule, the application of which is
occasioned by a writing. It is a commonly accepted view that, unless
otherwise required, the parties' agreement may consist of both oral
and written terms. However, where the parties' transaction is reduced
to writing, the underlying rationale of the parol evidence rule, tradi-
tionally, is that a writing is a more reliable indicator of the parties'
agreement and thus no prior or contemporaneous negotiations or
agreements are admissible to contradict and/or supplement the writ-
ing, depending upon whether the writing is determined to be totally or
partially integrated.75
If the writing is found to be totally integrated, the parties are
deemed to have intended for the writing to constitute their entire
agreement, and no extrinsic evidence is admissible to either supple-
ment or contradict the writing. On the other hand, if the writing is
determined to be partially integrated, the presumption is that the par-
ties intended for the writing to "represent all their engagements as to
the elements dealt with in the writing."76 Thus, in order for a party to
introduce any negotiations or agreements that took place prior to or
contemporaneous with the writing, the party will be required to
demonstrate that the extrinsic evidence was not dealt with in the writ-
74. Id. at 307.
75. 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 33:1 (R. Lord 4th ed.1999); see also Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Morehead, 183 S.E. 606, 607 (N.C. 1936) ("It is
well-nigh axiomatic that no verbal agreement between the parties to a written contract, made by
or at the time of the execution of such contract, is admissible to vary the terms or to contradict
its provisions .... "); Neal v. Marrone, 79 S.E.2d 239 (N.C. 1953); Hall v. Hotel L'Europe, Inc.,
318 S.E.2d 99 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); John P. Dalzell, Twenty-Five Years of Parol Evidence in
North Carolina, 33 N.C. L. REV. 420 (1955).
76. Hall, 318 S.E.2d at 101.
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ing and would therefore supplement the writing.77 North Carolina
case law is in line with that of other jurisdictions in holding that prom-
issory notes are not subject to the parol evidence rule to the same
extent as other contracts.78 The rationale is that since such contracts
consist of a standardized format, collateral terms and conditions are
likely to be omitted. Consequently, the courts generally have little
difficulty concluding that promissory notes are partially integrated.79
As a partially integrated writing, a promissory note can be supple-
mented but not contradicted. In this regard, however, North Carolina
courts tend to have a fairly liberal construction of what constitutes a
contradiction of the writing when the extrinsic evidence pertains to
promissory notes. Although the language of the opinions is consistent
with the view that would only permit the introduction of evidence that
supplements rather than contradicts the writing, evidence that has
been held admissible seemingly contradicts the terms of the promis-
sory note.8 °
In determining whether the writing is totally or partially integrated,
Williston's view favors the writing and would therefore limit the cir-
cumstances under which extrinsic evidence is admissible." Corbin's
view, on the other hand, supports taking into account all circum-
stances in ascertaining the nature and extent of the parties' agree-
ment.8 2 He maintains the completeness of an agreement cannot be
determined without a consideration of these circumstances.
83
77. See, e.g., A & A Discount Center, Inc. v. Sawyer, 219 S.E.2d 532, 534 (N.C. Ct. App.
1975) (The court held that where a printed form contract was not intended to integrate and
supersede all negotiations and agreements between the parties, representations that the pool
would be suitable for commercial use was not excluded by the parol evidence rule.).
78. See generally, North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Gillespie, 230 S.E.2d 375, 378-379 (N.C.
1976); DeHart v. R/S Fin. Corp., 337 S.E.2d 94, 97 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (promissory notes not
generally subject to the parol evidence rule to the same extent as other contracts.).
79. Borden, Inc. v. Brower, 199 S.E.2d 414, 419 (N.C. 1973) (It is common for a promissory
note to be considered partially integrated.); Powell v. Omli, 429 S.E.2d 774, 777 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993) (It is common for a promissory note to be intended only as a partial integration.).
80. Smith-Premier Typewriter Co. v. Rowan Hardware Co., 55 S.E. 417 (N.C. 1906) (The
court held that when a promissory note is given payable in money, parol evidence may be re-
ceived that establishes as a part of the contract, a contemporaneous agreement that a different
method of payment should be accepted.); Evans v. Freeman, 54 S.E. 847 (N.C. 1906) (The court,
in admitting oral evidence of a collateral agreement regarding how an instrument for payment of
money should be paid even though the promise in writing was for payment of money, concluded
that the evidence was competent because it did not conflict with the writing.); see Dalzell, supra
note 73, at 432-435.
81. WILLISTON, supra note 53, § 33:39 ("[Wlhere there is no ambiguity in the contract, ei-
ther in its literal sense, or when it is applied to the subject thereof, it must speak for itself,
entirely unaided by extrinsic matter .... ).
82. 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNrrAcrs § 579 (1960) ("No parol evidence that is offered
can be said to vary or contradict a writing until by process of interpretation, it is determined
what the writing means .... ").
83. Arthur Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 608-609 (1944).
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Corbin's approach is also reflected in the revised Restatement.84 In
addition, the Code's version of the Parol Evidence Rule as it applies
to a contract for the sale of goods reflects Corbin's more liberal ap-
proach." In an effort to limit the transaction to the writing, parties
will routinely include a "merger clause" which essentially merges all
prior negotiations and agreements into the writing and provides that
the writing represents the complete agreement of the parties. While
courts that favor Corbin's approach would look behind a merger
clause, North Carolina courts generally refrain from varying or adding
terms where a merger clause is present, absent some exception to the
parol evidence rule that would generally permit the court to go be-
yond the writing.86
Approaches to Interpretation
While the parol evidence rule assists the court in ascertaining the
scope of the parties' agreement, the meaning of the agreement can
also be a source of disagreement. This is significant inasmuch as the
court must determine the nature of the parties' obligations in order to
make decisions regarding their respective rights and liabilities. Long-
standing canons of interpretation utilized by the courts include such
maxims as noscitur a sociis which provides that the meaning of a word
may be affected by its immediate context. This maxim is illustrated in
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp..87 In
that case where the English word "chicken" was used in a contract
that was written primarily in German, it was argued that the English
word for chicken was used to specify "broilers" because the German
word for chicken was inclusive of both broilers and stewing chickens.88
Other maxims include expressio unius est exclusio alterius, under
which the expression of one thing is deemed to be the exclusion of
another; ejusdem generis which provides that a general term joined
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981) ("Agreements and negotiations
prior to or contemporaneous with the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to estab-
lish ... that the writing is or is not an integrated agreement.., that the integrated agreement, if
any, is completely or partially integrated [and] the meaning of the writing, whether or not inte-
grated ....").
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-202 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.) ("Terms with re-
spect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth
in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such
terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of
a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented . . . by course of
dealing or usage of trade ... or by course of performance . . . and by evidence of consistent
additional terms unless the court finds the wiring to have been intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement .....
86. Dalzell, supra note 73, at 422.
87. Frigaliment Imp. Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (D.C.N.Y. 1960).
88. Id. at 118.
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with a specific one will be deemed to include only things that are like
the specific term; and contra proferentem which provides that where a
document is subject to more than one interpretation, the court will
construe the document against its drafter and prefer the interpretation
of the non-drafting party.89
Although the parol evidence rule technically does not exclude ex-
trinsic evidence that is offered for the purpose of explaining an inte-
grated writing, when faced with an interpretation issue, the courts as
well as the commentators have split on the circumstances that will
warrant the admission of extrinsic evidence to explain or interpret the
parties' agreement.90 Courts that adhere to Williston's approach,
which restricts the circumstances under which extrinsic evidence is ad-
missible to interpret the document, will admit extrinsic evidence to
explain or interpret the writing only if the disputed term is first deter-
mined to be ambiguous. If the meaning of the disputed term is
deemed to be clear from the document itself under the "plain mean-
ing" rule, the court will decline to interpret the parties' agreement.
On the other hand, courts that are in agreement with Corbin's view
that words are subject to more than one meaning, and therefore a
term that appears to be clear on the face of a document, may have a
meaning totally different from that which is normally ascribed to it,
will admit extrinsic evidence absent a facial ambiguity. If the term in
dispute is reasonably susceptible to the asserted meaning, courts
favoring Corbin's view will admit any evidence that will assist in deter-
mining the meaning of the term in dispute. The language of the Code
is reflective of the more expansive approach taken by Corbin in that
there is no requirement that an ambiguity be established prior to in-
troducing a trade usage to establish the meaning of a disputed term.
In an effort to ascertain the parties' intent, the courts historically
followed the subjectivist approach which essentially provides that
where the parties attach different meanings to the disputed term, no
contract is formed. Courts later began to favor the objective theory
which accorded to the parties' agreement that meaning which a rea-
sonable person would attach to the disputed term. The application of
the objective approach, however, could lead to the extreme outcome
where parties were bound to terms that neither intended. 91 The modi-
fied objective approach represents the middle-ground approach and
89. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 7.11.
90. CALAMARI, supra note 37, § 3-15; Roebuck v. Carson, 146 S.E. 708 (N.C. 1929).
91. E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 951 (1967)
(The author noted that the object of contract law is to protect the justifiable expectations of the
contracting parties themselves, not those of third parties, including reasonable third parties. The
author further surmised that a formula that does not take into account the actual expectations of
either party is unlikely to yield a serviceable result.).
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provides that where the parties attach different meanings to the terms
and one party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached by
the other party, the court will attach the meaning asserted by the so-
called innocent party. If the parties attach different meaning to the
terms and neither party either knows or has reason to know what the
other party meant, there is no contract.
The modified objective approach was followed in Joyner v. Adams
where the North Carolina Court of Appeals emphasized that whether
the parties knew or had reason to know of the other's meaning of the
disputed language was essential to a proper determination of the con-
tract's enforceability.9" In that case, the parties disagreed over the
meaning of the term "develop." The court applied the modified objec-
tive theory when it stated that where one party knows or has reason to
know what the other party means by certain language and the other
party does not know or have reason to know of the meaning attached
to the disputed language by the first party, the court will enforce the
contract in accordance with the "innocent" party's meaning. 93
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONTRACT
Statute of Frauds
Apart from questions regarding contract formation and interpreta-
tion, various factual circumstances may give rise to issues of enforce-
ability of the parties' contract. Circumstances impacting on the
court's willingness or ability to enforce the parties' agreement can
range from issues of procedure to matters of mistake, changed circum-
stances, and public policy. A procedural requirement that can impact
the enforceability of the parties' agreement is the requirement that
certain types of contracts be reduced to writing. This requirement has
its origin in the English Statute of Frauds, some version of which was
subsequently enacted in a majority of jurisdictions in the United
States. 94 The Statute of Frauds enacted by the English Parliament set
out the following circumstances under which the parties are required
to reduce their agreement to writing:
1. A promise by an executor to pay the decedent's debts out of the
executor's funds;
2. A promise to answer for the debt of another;
3. A promise made in consideration of marriage;
4. A promise to convey an interest in land; and
92. Joyner v. Adams, 361 S.E.2d 902 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
93. Id. at 906.
94. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 6.1.
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5. An agreement that cannot be performed within a year of its
making.95
Provisions (1) and (2) of the English Statute of Frauds are codified
in section 22-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, 96 and provi-
sion (4) is codified in section 22-2 of the North Carolina General Stat-
utes.97 The requirement that a promise to convey an interest in land
be in writing applies to lease agreements as well as options for the sale
or lease of real property. Although all jurisdictions that adopted some
version of the Statute of Frauds require a lease agreement to be in
writing, most require a writing only where the lease agreement is con-
sidered long-term rather than short-term. North Carolina's statute,
however, sets out categories of leases concerning real property and
differentiates the writing requirement in accordance with the type of
lease involved as set forth below:
All contracts to sell or convey any lands, tenements or hereditaments,
or any interest in or concerning them, and all leases and contracts for
leasing land for the purpose of digging for gold or other minerals, or
for mining generally, of whatever duration, and all other leases and
contracts for leasing lands exceeding in duration three years from the
making thereof, shall be void unless said contract, or some memoran-
dum or note thereof, be8put in writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith ....
Many jurisdictions added writing requirements beyond those set out
in the original Statute of Frauds. North Carolina, for example, re-
quires a promise that limits a promisor's right to do business in the
state to be in writing and signed by the party to be bound. These
promises include territorial limitations on competition as well as
promises by employees not to compete with a former employer. 99
Additionally, North Carolina statutorily requires that a lending insti-
tution's promise to make a commercial loan in an amount in excess of
$50,000 be in writing.100 Contracts involving the sale of goods are gov-
erned by the Code's writing requirement which specifies that contracts
for the sale of goods for $500.00 or more must be in writing.'0" More-
over, North Carolina requires that a promise to pay a debt discharged
95. Id. § 6.2.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-1 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.) (Contracts charging the
representative personally and promises to pay the debt of another must be in writing and signed
by the party to be charged.).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.).
98. Id.
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-5 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.) (A loan commitment by
a bank, savings & loan or credit union in excess of $50,000 must be in writing; however, offers,
agreements, commitments or contracts to extend credit primarily for aquaculture, agricultural,
or farming purposes are specifically exempted.).
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.).
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by bankruptcy be in writing.112 Although the one-year provision in
the English Statute of Frauds is law in virtually all jurisdictions, North
Carolina did not enact this provision. 10 3 Consequently, there is no re-
quirement in North Carolina that contracts that cannot be performed
within a year of their making be in writing.
Disputes frequently center around whether the transaction is one
that is governed by the Statute of Frauds and whether the writing is
sufficient to satisfy the writing requirement. Under the suretyship re-
quirement that a promise to pay the debt of another be in writing, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the purchaser of property
who agreed to discharge a debt due by the seller was not protected by
the Statute of Frauds.10 4 In that case, the defendant purchased a truck
from a seller who had purchased tires for the truck on credit from the
plaintiff.105 The defendant orally promised the seller that he would
pay the plaintiff for the tires. 0 6 When the seller declared bankruptcy
and the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant, the latter
asserted that his promise was one to pay the debt of another and was
unenforceable since it had not been reduced to writing. 10 7 The court
held that since the promise was made to the seller and not to the
plaintiff, it did not come within the Statute of Frauds and was there-
fore enforceable even though it was an oral promise. 0 8 North Caro-
lina has held that option contracts for the purchase of property are
governed by the Statute of Frauds writing requirement, 0 9 and that a
one-year lease agreement with a four-year renewal provision is, like-
wise, governed by the Statute of Frauds and required to be in writ-
ing." 0 The court reasoned that while the initial lease agreement was
less than three years, the three-year renewal option obligated the
party beyond the initial lease period, and therefore the agreement fell
within the Statute of Frauds.
In general, the writing requirement is satisfied if the agreement or
some memorandum thereof is in writing signed by the party being
charged, and the writing identifies the parties to the contract, indicates
the subject matter of the contract, and states the essential terms of the
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-4 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.) ("No promise to pay a
debt discharged by any decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, in any proceeding in bank-
ruptcy, shall be received in evidence unless such promise is in writing and signed by the party to
be charged therewith.").
103. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 6.4.
104. Brad Ragan, Inc. v. Callicutt Enters., 326 S.E.2d 62 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
105. Id. at 63.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 64.
108. Id. at 63-64; in accord, Satterfield v. Kindley, 57 S.E. 145 (N.C. 1907); Rice v. Carter, 33
N.C. 298 (11 Ired. 1850).
109. Craig v. Kessing, 244 S.E.2d 721, 723 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978).
110. Wright v. Allred, 37 S.E.2d 107, 108 (N.C. 1946).
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agreement."'t North Carolina statutory and case law are in agreement
with these requirements."t 2
Where a transaction falls within the Statute of Frauds and the writ-
ing requirement is not satisfied, consequences vary. Although Section
22-2 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which sets out the writ-
ing requirements for conveyances of real property, states that a trans-
action that does not comply with the writing requirement is void," 13
the courts have construed this to mean that the transaction is voida-
ble. 14 Moreover, the courts have held that the consequences are only
applicable where the contract is executory. 115 In many jurisdictions,
part performance of certain contracts that do not meet the writing
requirements has been sufficient to remove the Statute of Frauds as a
bar to enforcement of the parties' agreement. The rationale is that
part performance furnishes a reliable indicator of the existence of a
contract, notwithstanding the absence of a writing. For example, if the
vendee in a transaction involving the transfer of interest in real estate
that was not reduced to writing has paid part of the purchase price and
made improvements, courts in many jurisdictions will permit enforce-
ment of the transaction based upon the vendee's part performance." 16
North Carolina, however, is among a distinct minority of jurisdictions
that have consistently refused to adopt this view, and the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court reiterated its position in Grantham v. Grantham
when it stated that "[t]he doctrine of part performance . . . has no
place in our jurisprudence, and will not dispense with the necessity of
a writing ..... 1 Consequently, in North Carolina, a vendee's pay-
ment of a portion of a purchase price and improvements to property
will not result in the enforcement of an agreement that does not com-
ply with the Statute of Frauds writing requirement." 8
In general, failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds writing re-
quirement will result in an agreement that is unenforceable. How-
111. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 6.7.
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.) ("[The] contract, or
some memorandum or note thereof, [must] be put in writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith ..... ); Kidd v. Early, 222 S.E.2d 392, 400 (N.C. 1976) (the court held that
several writings taken together could satisfy the Statute of Frauds writing requirement); Rape v.
Lyerly, 215 S.E.2d 737, 746 (N.C. 1975); Hurdle v. White, 239 S.E.2d 589, 592 (N.C. Ct. App.
1977) (check endorsed by the defendant held to be a sufficient memorandum under the Statute
of Frauds).
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.).
114. Herring v. Volume Merch., Inc., 106 S.E.2d 197, 200 (N.C. 1958).
115. Keith Bros. v. Kennedy, 140 S.E. 721 (N.C. 1927); Durham Consol. Land & Improve-
ment Co. v. Guthrie, 21 S.E. 952 (N.C. 1895) (purchaser was not permitted to recover deposit on
money paid on grounds that the contract was void.).
116. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 6.9.
117. Grantham v. Grantham, 171 S.E. 331, 333 (N.C. 1933), disapproved on other grounds by
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ever, in addition to the doctrine of part performance which is
recognized in a majority of jurisdictions,119 the Code sets out circum-
stances under which a transaction involving the sale of goods may be
enforced even though it does not meet the writing requirement. Spe-
cifically, the Code provides as follows:
[A] contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1)
but which is valid in other respects is enforceable:
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and
are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the
seller's business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is re-
ceived and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that
the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial begin-
ning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement;
or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale
was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision
beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and ac-
cepted or which have been received and accepted ....
Historically, in North Carolina, a party's admission of a contract in
a deposition or answer did not bar the party from pleading the Statute
of Frauds as a defense. 21 This remains true for those transactions that
are not governed by Section 25-2-201 of the North Carolina General
Statutes.
Parties who fail to meet the Statute of Frauds writing requirements
may also resort to the doctrines of restitution and estoppel as an alter-
native basis for relief. The doctrine of restitution may be available
where the injured party has conferred a benefit on the other party by
partial performance1 2 2 or payment of money.123 Although the draft-
ers of the Restatement added a provision that speaks directly to reli-
119. Pickelsimer v. Pickelsimer, 127 S.E.2d 557, 562 (N.C. 1962).
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201 (1999).
121. Weant v. McCanless, 70 S.E.2d 196, 198 (N.C. 1952); Pierce v. Gaddy, 257 S.E.2d 459,
462 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
122. "Partial performance" is to be distinguished from the "Part Performance Doctrine" in
that the latter, as it applies to real property, generally requires some combination of possession,
improvements, and part payment. "Partial performance," on the other hand, more broadly ap-
plies to any performance of a contract that is less than complete performance.
123. Pickelsimer, 127 S.E.2d at 560 (holding that "[w]here the promisor in an oral contract to
convey or devise real property has received the purchase price in money or other valuable con-
sideration and has failed to transfer title, the promisee may recover the consideration in an
action of quasi-contract for money had and received or under the doctrine of unjust
enrichment.").
26
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 [2004], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol27/iss1/4
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
ance in the context of the Statute of Frauds,2 4 recognition by the
courts of reliance as a basis for relief has been uneven, and jurisdic-
tions are generally split on whether claims based upon promissory es-
toppel should be allowed in this context. Case law in North Carolina
supports promissory estoppel as a basis for the enforcement of certain




In other instances, the court's refusal to enforce a contract may be
based upon public policy considerations. One such contract is that
which is entered into by a minor or a person who is mentally incapaci-
tated. The rationale is that both categories of parties are in need of
protection due to their status and therefore the contracts of such par-
ties are voidable. With respect to minors, the general rule is that con-
tracts entered into by minors are voidable and may not be enforced by
the other party to the contract unless the contract is ratified by the
minor. The minor's failure to disaffirm a contract within a reasonable
time after reaching majority age is deemed to be ratification. Moreo-
ver, whether a minor has failed to disaffirm a contract within a reason-
able time after reaching majority age has also been a source of
disagreement. In Bobby Floars Toyota, Inc. v. Smith, the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals held that a minor who maintained possession of
an automobile for ten months after reaching majority age had failed to
disaffirm within a reasonable time. 126 North Carolina follows the gen-
eral rule that a minor's misrepresentation of her age will not prevent
her from disaffirming the contract. 127 Where a minor elects to disaf-
firm the contract, she can do so without restoring the other party to
the contract to status quo. While a minor is required to return the
subject matter of the contract if it remains in the minor's possession,
the inability of the minor to do so will not preclude the minor from
disaffirming the contract. Moreover, upon disaffirmance, minors are
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981) ("A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Stat-
ute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise ... ").
125. Wachovia Bank & Trust v. Rubish, 293 S.E.2d 749, 759 (N.C. 1983). Murphy, supra note
26, at 387 (The author noted that the court in Campbell based its decision on the North Carolina
Supreme Court's apparent approval of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139.); see also
Holmes, supra, note 42, at 427-431 (the author expresses some ambivalence about the extent to
which promissory estoppel is applied by North Carolina courts to bar the Statute of Frauds, but
ultimately concludes that the history of North Carolina cases reveals an inclination to use prom-
issory estoppel as an exception to the Statute of Frauds.).
126. Bobby Floars Toyota, Inc. v. Smith, 269 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
127. Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 116 S.E. 261 (N.C. 1923).
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entitled to a return of the consideration provided. North Carolina
courts, however, have construed the consideration to consist of the
value of the property at the time the contract was entered into rather
than the agreed contract price. 128 Unlike minors, persons who seek to
disaffirm their contract on the grounds of mental incapacity must re-
store the other party to the transaction to status quo, or otherwise
compensate that party as a prerequisite to disaffirmance29
The "Doctrine of Necessaries" stands as an exception to the general
rule and provides that where a minor contracts for goods or services
that are deemed to be "necessaries," the minor will be liable for the
reasonable value of the subject matter of the contract. 130 One ques-
tion that may arise under an application of the "Doctrine of Neces-
saries" relates to what constitutes a "necessary." Generally, a
''necessary" will depend upon the status of the minor as well as the
minor's "rank and station" in life.131 In one case, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that where a minor contracted with an employ-
ment agency, such services were deemed necessary, and the minor was
therefore liable for the reasonable value of the services. 13 2 In addition
to the "Doctrine of Necessaries," there are statutorily created excep-
tions under which minors may be held liable on their contracts. For
example, Section 116-174.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes
provides that minors age seventeen and over can enter into contracts
to borrow money to pay for post-secondary education.133
Where a person seeks to avoid enforcement of a contract on the
grounds of mental incapacity, the "cognitive" test has been applied in
a majority of jurisdictions. Under the "cognitive" test, the court must
determine whether the party lacked the ability to understand the na-
ture and consequences of her actions at the time she entered into the
128. Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, Inc., 150 S.E. 177 (N.C. 1929) (The court held that the minor
upon disaffirmance of the contract was entitled to the $40.95 paid on the note plus the fair
market value of the truck at that the time of the trade, but that the minor was not entitled, as a
matter of law, to $250.00, the stipulated exchange value of the truck.).
129. See, e.g., Wadford v. Gillette, 137 S.E. 314, 317 (N.C. 1927) ("[W]hen a contract with an
insane person is executed and completed, and is fair and made in good faith, without notice of
mental incapacity, and the parties cannot again be put in statu quo, such contract is valid and
enforceable .... ").
130. Hyman v. Cain, 48 N.C. 111 (3 Jones 1855) ("[I]nfants had better be held liable to pay
for necessary food, clothing, etc. than for the want of credit, to be left to starve.").
131. Gastonia Personnel Corp. v. Rogers, 172 S.E.2d 19, 21 (N.C. 1970) (The court described
the word "necessaries" to include not only those articles that are "absolutely necessary to sup-
port life, but it includes also such articles as are suitable to the state, station and degree in life of
the person to whom they are furnished .... ).
132. Id. at 24 (Where the minor was a 19-year old married high school graduate, the court
enlarged the concept of "necessaries" to include "such articles of property and such services as
are reasonably necessary to enable the infant to earn the money required to provide the necessi-
ties of life for himself and those who are legally dependent upon him .... ").
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-174.1 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.).
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contract. In Matthews v. James, the court of appeals set out that test
as it is applied in North Carolina:
[A] person has mental capacity sufficient to contract if he knows what
he is about... and... the measure of capacity is the ability to under-
stand the nature of the act in which he is engaged and its scope and
effect, or its nature and consequences, not that he should be able to
act wisely or discreetly, nor to drive a good bargain, but that he should
be in such possession of his faculties as to enable him to know at least
what he is doing and to contract understandingly .... "
A minority of jurisdictions also apply the "volitional" test under which
the court must determine whether the party lacked the ability to act
reasonably with respect to the transaction and whether the other party
to the transaction had reason to know this. Thus, the "volitional" test
differs from the "cognitive" test in that, under the "volitional" test, a
party may be deemed to be mentally incapacitated for purposes of
disaffirming the contract even though she was able to understand the
nature and consequences of her conduct. The "volitional" test also
differs from the "cognitive" test in that knowledge of the other party
to the transaction is a key component of the "volitional" test while it is
not a factor in the application of the "cognitive" test. In a long line of
decisions, however, North Carolina courts depart from this general
view and include knowledge of the other party as a factor in determin-
ing the enforceability of a contract under the "cognitive" test for
mental incompetence. In Hedgepeth v. Home Savings & Loan Ass'n,
the court, citing prior decisions, announced that:
[T]he party contracting with an incompetent may nevertheless enforce
the agreement if the following requirements can be established: (1)
ignorance of the party's mental incapacity; (2) lack of notice of the
incapacity such as could indicate to a reasonably prudent person that
inquiry should be made of the party's mental condition; (3) payment
of a full and fair consideration; (4) that no unfair advantage was taken
of the incompetent; and (5) that the incompetent had not restored and
could not restore consideration or make adequate compensation
therefore ... 135
Since the crucial point in time for determining a party's mental state
is at the time she entered into the transaction, the party's mental state
prior to that time or subsequent to that time is generally deemed not
to have any relevance. Nonetheless, as illustrated in Matthews, the
court, may under certain circumstances, reach a contrary result. In
that case, the court noted that while evidence of a party's mental con-
134. Matthews v. James, 362 S.E.2d 594, 597 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
135. Hedgepeth v. Home Savings and Loan Ass'n, 361 S.E.2d 888, 889-90 (N.C. Ct. App.
1987); see also Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 150 S.E.2d 40, 44 (N.C. 1966); Wadford v. Gillette,
137 S.E. at 317.
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dition at a time remote from the execution of a document is generally
not admissible, where the party has a progressive degenerative illness,
evidence of the party's condition some years prior to and after the
date of execution of the document could be admissible to show the
onset of the disorder and the gradual deterioration of the party's mind
and will.136
In addition to refusing to enforce a contract based upon a party's
status, the court may also withhold enforcement based upon the cir-
cumstances under which a party entered into a contract. Such circum-
stances can relate to the requirements for the formation of a contract
as well as considerations of public policy. Transactions which are
characterized by these circumstances include those involving duress
and undue influence, misrepresentation and unconscionability. Such
transactions have in common the absence of informed voluntary ac-
quiescence that serves as the basis for contract formation.
Moreover, elements of bad faith and unfairness tend to typify these
types of transactions. North Carolina law is generally consistent with
the majority view with respect to these transactions, and contracts that
are entered into as a result of duress, undue influence and misrepre-
sentation are voidable. Under North Carolina case law, in order to
show undue influence, a party must show that "something operated in
the mind of the person who was allegedly influenced that had 'a con-
trolling effect sufficient to destroy the person's free agency and to
render the instrument not properly an expression of the person's
wishes, but rather the expression of the wishes of another or
others."" 37 The North Carolina Supreme Court enunciated the doc-
trine of duress in Smithwick v. Whitley when it stated that "[d]uress
exists where one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a
contract or perform or forego some act under circumstances which
deprive him of the exercise of free will."' 38 In its inception, duress
was commonly said to be "of the person" and was manifested by im-
prisonment, threats, or force, or it was said to be "of goods" where a
person was obliged to submit to an illegal extraction in order to obtain
possession of unlawfully detained property.' 39 While the initial focus
under an application of duress was on an unlawful act, in Link v. Link,
North Carolina case law was brought in line with the weight of author-
ity when the court expressly adopted the rule that the act done or
136. Matthews, 362 S.E.2d. at 600, see also In re Daniels, 313 8.E.2d 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(evidence of mental deterioration due to arteriosclerosis nine years prior to the execution of a
will was held admissible.).
137. Matthews, 362 S.E.2d at 598 (citing Hardee v. Hardee, 309 S.E.2d 243. 245 (N.C. 1983)).
138. Smithwick v. Whitley, 67 S.E. 913, 913 (N.C. 1910).
139. Id.
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threatened may be wrongful even though not unlawful per se. 14 0 To-
day, the doctrine of duress has been broadened to include the concept
of "economic duress," which is recognized by North Carolina
courts.14' The doctrine of misrepresentation generally requires a false
and material representation that was reasonably relied upon. While
North Carolina case law is consistent with the majority view with re-
spect to these requirements, 42 the doctrine appears to have been ap-
plied primarily in cases involving insurance companies seeking to
avoid payment under insurance policies. 143 Since the remedy for mis-
representation grounded in contract theory is rescission of the parties'
agreement, parties seeking money damages raise negligent or fraudu-
lent misrepresentation grounded in tort theory. Although expressed
differently by various courts, contracts that are found to be uncon-
scionable are generally contracts that involve some element of one-
sidedness where there is a lack of meaningful choice on the part of
one party and terms that unreasonably favor the other party.
144
Under North Carolina case law, a determination of unconscionability
requires a finding of both substantive and procedural unfairness.
45
Contracts for the sale of goods are governed by the Code's provision
140. Link v. Link, 179 S.E.2d 697, 705 (N.C. 1971).
141. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 442 S.E.2d 133, 136 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (Where the plaintiff
argued that the defendant was obligated by a Buy-Sell Agreement to sell his stock to plaintiff for
book value, and therefore defendant's demand for a greater sum was a threat of breach of con-
tract and constituted economic duress, the court held that a mere breach of the contract, without
more, was insufficient to establish duress.).
142. See, e.g., Tolbert v. Mut. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 72 S.E.2d 915 (N.C. 1952) ("To avoid
liability on the policy [the defendant] was only required to show that the representations were
material and that they were untrue .... ).
143. Hardy v. Integon Life Ins. Corp., 355 S.E.2d 241 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) ("It is well settled
in this State that an insurer may avoid his obligations under an insurance contract by showing
that the insured made false representations in his application and that the misrepresentations
were material .... ); in accord, Pittman v. First Prot. Life Ins. Co., 325 S.E.2d 287 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985) ("It is a basic principle of insurance law that the insurer may avoid his obligation under the
insurance contract by a showing that the insured made representations on his application that
were material and false .... ).
144. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (A seminal
case on unconscionability in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia held that the trial court was empowered to find that an agreement between a recipient of
public assistance and a furniture company which was manifested by a standardized document
containing a "dragnet clause" was unconscionable.).
145. Lancaster v. Lancaster, 530 S.E.2d 82, 84 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (Where the court noted
that unconscionability was both procedural in that it can consist of fraud, coercion, undue influ-
ence, misrepresentation, inadequate disclosure, duress and overreaching, and substantive, in that
it involves contracts that are harsh, oppressive and one-sided.); see also King v. King, 442 S.E.2d
154, 157 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (The court noted that procedural unconscionability involves
Inaughtiness' in the formation, and substantive unconscionability involves inequality of bargain-
ing power. The court pointed out, however, that the inequality of the bargain must be so mani-
fest as to shock the judgment of a person of common sense and the terms must be so oppressive
that no reasonable person would make them and no fair person would accept them.).
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on unconscionability. 14 6 Moreover, North Carolina is among those ju-
risdictions that have adopted the "Doctrine of Reasonable Expecta-
tions" which applies primarily to insurance contracts. 14 7 The doctrine
has been described as "'the objectively reasonable [expectation] of
applicants and intended beneficiaries [that] the terms of insurance
contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations."' 148
While it is generally said that parties are free to contract, and in so
doing, have wide latitude in shaping the terms of their agreement, this
freedom is outweighed by considerations of public policy. As such,
the court can refuse to enforce an agreement that violates some tenet
of public policy. Contracts entered into in violation of a law would fall
into this category. In Cole v. Hughes, where a dispute arose over own-
ership of Virginia lottery tickets, the court cited several statutory pro-
visions to emphasize that North Carolina's public policy is against
gambling and lotteries, and held that a claim to enforce a contract that
was illegal and against public policy was properly dismissed by the
trial court.149
Contracts entered into by parties who have failed to comply with
relevant statutory requirements such as obtaining a license to operate
or practice a trade or profession can also fall into the category of con-
tracts that contravene public policy. The court's treatment of these
contracts, however, will depend upon a number of factors. One con-
sideration the court will take into account is protecting the justified
expectations of the parties to the contract. Other considerations in-
clude the possible forfeiture that would result if enforcement is de-
nied; the relative fault of the parties; the likelihood that refusal to
enforce the contract will further the relevant public policy; and the
remoteness of the relationship between the contract and the public
policy.' 50
The courts, in deciding whether to enforce a contract entered into
by a party who has failed to comply with a pertinent statute, may dis-
tinguish between a "revenue-raising" statute and a "regulatory" stat-
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.) ([I]f the court as a
matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the
time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder
of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any un-
conscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result .. "); Roszkowski, supra note 43 at
933 (No significant change to 2-302 proposed).
147. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 279 S.E.2d 769, 771 (N.C. 1981) ("Doctrine
of Reasonable Expectations" adopted by the North Carolina Supreme Court.).
148. Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1461, 1461 (1989) (quoting Professor Robert Keeton).
149. Cole v. Hughes, 442 S.E.2d 86, 88-89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); see also Basnight v. Am.
Mfg. Co., 93 S.E. 734 (N.C. 1917).
150. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 5.1.
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ute. The former type of statute is generally enacted for the purpose of
raising revenue and is not directed at the protection of the public.
Thus the party may be subject to sanctions for failing to comply with
the statute, but the court will generally permit a party who enters into
a contract without having complied with such a statute to enforce the
contract. On the other hand, if the statute is determined to be regula-
tory, the court may refuse to allow the noncompliant party to enforce
the contract. In Bryan Builders Supply v. Midyette, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that an unlicensed contractor could not re-
cover either for breach of contract or in an action based on quantum
meruit or unjust enrichment even though the statute did not expressly
prohibit such a result. 151 The court reasoned that allowing recovery
would defeat the legislative purpose of the statute which was to pro-
tect the public from incompetent contractors. 152 On the other hand,
in Marriott Financial Services, Inc. v. Capitol Funds, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court refused to void a conveyance of land because of
the seller's failure to comply with a city code requiring filing an ap-
proval of plats before property is sold.15 3 The court held that the leg-
islative bodies did not intend to invalidate conveyances because of
failure to follow the provisions of the legislation even though the legis-
lation was penal in nature.'5 4 The court reasoned that where the con-
tract is not in itself immoral or criminal, it will not be voided on the
basis that the statute imposes a penalty.155 Rather, the penalty for
violating the statute may be limited to that expressed in the statute
itself.156 It appears from a reading of North Carolina cases that the
decision to enforce the contract of a party who has failed to comply
with a related statute turns on the court's interpretation of the legisla-
tive intent rather than the nature of the statute. Thus, failure to com-
ply with a penal statute would not, in itself, preclude enforcement of
the parties' agreement.
Covenants not to compete also fall into the category of contracts
that courts may refuse to enforce on grounds of public policy. Here,
the policy is that of favoring the ability of parties to engage in free
trade without any types of restraints. When examining covenants not
to compete, the courts tend to categorize them as ancillary, meaning
that they are associated with another contract between the parties, or
151. Bryan Builders Supply v. Midyette, 162 S.E.2d 507 (N.C. 1968); But cf. Sykes v. Thomp-
son, 76 S.E. 252 (N.C. 1912) (where the court held that a father was entitled to restitution of
money paid to prevent prosecution of his sons on charges that were later found to be false).
152. Id. at 510-511.
153. Marriott Fin. Serv. v. Capitol Funds, 217 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1975).
154. Id. at 560.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 557-560.
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non-ancillary, meaning that the covenants stand alone as an agree-
ment between the parties. The latter type of covenant is said to be a
direct restraint on free trade, serves no justifiable purpose, and is
therefore unenforceable. Unlike the non-ancillary covenant, the an-
cillary covenant, while also restraining free trade, can serve a legiti-
mate purpose. Thus, the court's decision to enforce or not enforce the
ancillary covenant will turn on a number of factors. The court will
generally consider whether the nature of the restraint is reasonable;
whether the geographic reach of the restraint serves a legitimate inter-
est of the beneficiary of the covenant; whether the restraint places an
undue hardship on the party whose conduct is being restrained; and
whether the restraint is inimical to the public interest.
In Farr Associates, Inc. v. Baskin, the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals held that a non-compete agreement that limited an employee
from contacting the employer's client base for five years was unrea-
sonably broad.157 In that case, the non-compete agreement prohibited
the employee from providing services to any current client for three
years following the termination.158 It also stated that the employee
could not have contact with any persons who had been clients of the
company for the two years preceding the employee's termination.159
The company provided consulting services in forty-two states and four
other countries. 160 The court noted that the non-compete agreement
was in writing, was part of an employment contract, and was based on
valuable consideration. 61 The court focused its attention on whether
the non-compete agreement was reasonable as to time and territory,
and whether it was designed to protect the employer's legitimate busi-
ness interest. 162 The court answered the latter question in the affirma-
tive, but concluded that the covenant was unreasonable as to time and
territory restrictions and held that the covenant was unenforceable.1 63
PERFORMANCE AND BREACH
Mistake, Impossibility/Impracticability and Frustration of Purpose
Where a party seeks to be relieved from the obligation to perform a
contract on the grounds of mistake, the mistake can take the form of a
157. Farr Assoc. v. Baskin, 530 S.E.2d 878 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
158. Id. at 880.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 879.
161. Id. at 881.
162. Id. at 881-83.
163. Id. at 881; see also Nalle Clinic Co. v. Parker, 399 S.E.2d 363, 366 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)(a covenant by a doctor not to practice medicine or surgery for two years in a particular county
was unenforceable because of the harm to the public when the county had only one other pediat-
ric endocrinologist).
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unilateral mistake, where only one of the parties is mistaken, or a mu-
tual mistake, where both parties are mistaken. If both parties are mis-
taken, a party is generally entitled to relief from performance if the
mistake goes to a basic assumption on which the agreement was made,
it materially affects the parties' performance, and the party seeking to
be relieved from performance did not bear the risk of the mistake. If
only one party is mistaken, the courts are generally unwilling to re-
lieve that party of her obligations unless she can further show that it
would be unconscionable to require her to perform, or that the other
party knew or had reason to know of the mistake.164 North Carolina
case law is in accord, 65 and the courts have generally shown an un-
willingness to relieve a party from contractual obligations on the basis
of a unilateral mistake. 166
Three additional related grounds upon which a party may seek to
be relieved from the obligation to perform are impossibility, impracti-
cability and frustration of purpose. Historically, a party was not re-
lieved from the obligation to perform based upon impossibility unless
the impossibility resulted from the death of a party necessary for per-
formance of the contract, the destruction of a thing necessary for per-
formance of the contract, or a supervening illegality.' 67 The closely
related doctrine of frustration of purpose is alleged where perform-
ance of the contract remains possible but a fortuitous event super-
venes to cause failure of the consideration. In Brenner v. Little Red
School House, Ltd., the plaintiff argued that where he paid tuition in
advance for the entire year but his wife refused to enroll his son in the
164. See generally, CALAMARI AND PERILLO, supra note 40, §§ 9-25 to 29; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981);
Eric Rasmusen and Ian Ayres, Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 309 (1993).
165. See, e.g., Mullinax v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 395 S.E.2d 160, 162 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990)
("Our courts have long held that '[a] contract may be avoided on the ground of mutual mistake
of fact where the mistake is common to both parties and by reason of it each has done what
neither intended ... however, in order to affect the binding force of a contract, the mistake must
be of an existing or past fact which is material; it must be as to a fact which enters into and forms
the basis of the contract... it must be of the essence of the agreement .... '); see also Wake
Stone Corp. v. Hargrove, 400 S.E.2d 464, 466 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) ("A unilateral mistake, unac-
companied by fraud, imposition, undue influence, or like oppressive circumstances, is not suffi-
cient to avoid a contract .... .
166. See, e.g., Lowry v. Lowry, 393 S.E.2d 141 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (court held that a unilat-
eral mistake was not such that it would warrant reformation of the parties' contract); Thompson-
Arthur Paving Co. v. Lincoln Battleground Assoc., 382 S.E.2d 817 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (court
held that a settlement agreement was not subject to rescission because of the plaintiff's unilateral
mistake).
167. UNCC Props. v. Greene, 432 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (a contract to convey an
easement was discharged when the land was condemned by the government.); see also Steam-
boat Co. v. Trans. Co., 82 S.E. 956 (N.C. 1914) (Where defendant chartered plaintiff's steamboat
for a set rate on Sundays, and the steamboat was destroyed by fire, the court held that the
parties were discharged as to the executory portions of their contract.).
2004]
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school, he was entitled to a refund on the grounds of impossibility and
frustration of purpose.168 The court held that since the child could
have attended the school, performance was not impossible. 69 It went
on to say that frustration of purpose would only apply where the frus-
trating event was not foreseeable and where the plaintiff had not as-
sumed the risk of the occurrence of the event. 7 ° In this instance, the
court found that neither of these criteria was met in that the plaintiff
could have foreseen the possibility of his wife not enrolling the child
in the school, and he assumed the risk that his child might not enroll
when he signed a document which stated that the tuition payment was
non-refundable. 171 The doctrine of impracticability, which is codified
in the North Carolina General Statutes, 172 was at issue in Alamance
County Board. of Education v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, Inc.1 7 3 In
that case, the Environmental Protection Agency enacted new emis-
sion standards after the defendant had entered into a contract to pro-
vide parts to the plaintiff that were rendered out of compliance by the
new regulations.1 7 1 When the defendant informed the plaintiff the
item could not be supplied, the plaintiff obtained the items from an-
other supplier and brought an action against the defendant to recover
the difference. 175 The plaintiff sought to be relieved on the grounds of
impracticability resulting from the supervening governmental regula-
tion, and the court held that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of the
occurrence of the contingency, and therefore was not excused from
performance.176 Where a party is relieved from performance of a con-
tract on the grounds of mistake, impracticability, impossibility, or frus-
tration of purpose, the result is that the party will not be liable for
breach of contract for her failure to perform. North Carolina courts
have, however, imposed liability on the parties for performances ren-
dered prior to the occurrence of the impracticability, impossibility, or
168. Brenner v. Little Red Sch. House, Ltd., 274 S.E.2d 206 (N.C. 1981).
169. Id. at 208.
170. Id. at 209-10.
171. Id.; see also Fraver v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 318 S.E.2d 340 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1984).
172. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-615 (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.) ([D]elay in delivery
or non-delivery in whole... is not a breach of [the seller's] duty if ... performance as agreed has
been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency, the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made .... "); Roszkowski, supra note 46 at 941("Revised Section 2-615 continues the impracticability principles of existing Section 2-615, but
changes the language of Section 2-615(a) from "delay in delivery or nondelivery" to "delay in
performance or nonperformance.").
173. Alamance County Bd. of Educ. v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, Inc., 465 S.E.2d 306 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1996).
174. Id. at 308.
175. Id. at 309.
176. Id. at 310.
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frustration of purpose depending upon whether the contract was en-
tire or severable. 1
77
Anticipatory Repudiation, Material Breach and Express Conditions
The doctrines of anticipatory repudiation, material breach and ex-
press conditions pertain to nonperformance of the parties' contract
and the resulting consequences. North Carolina case law is in accord
with the general rule regarding anticipatory repudiation. The court of
appeals laid out the requirements in Dishner Developers, Inc. v.
Brown: "[I]n order to constitute anticipatory repudiation the words or
conduct evidencing an intention to breach the contract must be a 'pos-
itive, distinct, unequivocal and absolute refusal' to perform the con-
tract when the time fixed for performance arrives." '178
The usual consequence of anticipatory repudiation is that it gives
rise to a total breach.' 79 North Carolina's rule regarding material
breach is also in accord with the general rule that a material breach
will excuse the other party from the obligation to perform further.1 80
Whether the failure to perform contractual obligations is so material
as to excuse the other party from performing is a question of fact.181
In Lacy J. Miller Machinery Co. v. Miller, where the parties' agree-
ment provided for payment within ten days and thirty days of speci-
fied occurrences, but also contained a provision that in no event
would the payment be later than six months after the death of the
stockholder, the court held that the parties contemplated possible de-
lays and therefore payment of the proceeds within the six month pe-
riod was not a material breach. 82 Although a material breach relieves
the other party from the duty to perform, that party is required to
make an election to cancel the contract within a reasonable time after
knowledge of the material breach.183 Moreover, where a party elects
to cancel its performance on the erroneous belief that the other party
to the contract has committed a material breach, the consequence is
177. Steamboat Co. v. Transp. Co., 82 S.E. 956, 956-957 (N.C. 1914).
178. Dishner Developers, Inc. v. Brown, 549 S.E.2d 904, 908 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting
Gordon v. Howard, 379 S.E.2d 674,676 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)).
179. Starling v. Still, 485 S.E.2d 74, 78 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (The court noted, however, that
the general rule does not apply to an installment contract which contains no acceleration
clause.).
180. Lake Mary Ltd. v. Johnston, 551 S.E.2d 546, 555 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
181. Combined Ins. Co. of Am. v. McDonald, 243 S.E.2d 817, 819-20 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978)
(The court held that the mere failure to give notice of termination under an employment con-
tract did not constitute a material breach as a matter of law, but was a question of fact to be
determined by the fact finders. In that case, the court found no evidence to sustain a finding that
the parties intended the notice of termination provision to be a material part of their
agreement.).
182. Lacy J. Miller Mach. Co. v. Miller, 293 S.E.2d 622, 625 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
183. Marantz Piano Co. v. Kincaid, 424 S.E.2d 671 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
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that the non-breaching party's cancellation can constitute anticipatory
repudiation and place that party in material breach. 184 Where parties
describe express conditions in their contract, Chemical Realty Corp. v.
Home Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n sets forth the longstanding rule
that a party's failure to comply with a condition precedent to a con-
tract relieves the other party of its duty to perform.185
REMEDIES FOR BREACH
Protection of Expectation, Reliance and Restitutionary Interests
The manner in which the court formulates relief for the injured
party in a breach of contract cause of action varies depending upon
whether the court seeks to address the party's expectation interest,
reliance interest or restitutionary interest. If the court is seeking to
protect a party's expectation interest, it will attempt to fashion a rem-
edy that will put the party in the same position the party would have
been in absent the breach. If, on the other hand, the purpose of the
damages award is to protect the party's reliance interest, the effort is
to put the injured party in the same position the party was in before
she entered into the contract. Relief based on the party's restitution-
ary interest will focus on preventing the breaching party from benefit-
ing at the expense of the injured party.'86
Other Remedies & Limitations
What would seem to be the most logical form of relief for breach of
a contract is, in fact, available only under limited circumstances. Spe-
cific performance, which has been described as a remedy, the sole
function of which is to compel a party to do precisely what he ought to
have done without being coerced by the court,187 is an equitable rem-
edy that is generally available only where an injured party's remedy at
184. Millis Constr. Co. v. Fairfield Sapphire Valley, Inc., 358 S.E.2d 566, 570 (N.C. Ct. App.
1987) (The court held that if no material breach had occurred, the other party was not excused
from performance and that party's failure to perform constituted anticipatory repudiation which
itself is a material breach.); see also Beeson v. McDonald, 347 S.E.2d 485, 487 (N.C. Ct. App.
1986).
185. Chemical Realty Corp. v. Home Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n, 351 S.E.2d 786, 792 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1987) (The court noted that conditions precedent are not favored and therefore provi-
sions will not be construed as such in the absence of language clearly requiring such construc-
tion.); See also Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Fortress, 350 S.E.2d 131 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
186. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, §§ 12.9 (expectation damages), 12.16 (reliance damages)
and 12.19 (restitution damages); see also Meares v. Nixon Constr. Co., 173 S.E.2d 593 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1970) (The court stated that an award of damages should put the injured party in as near
the position he or she would have occupied absent the breach.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 344 (1981).
187. McLean v. Keith, 72 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. 1952).
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law is inadequate. 18 8 Factors generally considered by the courts, in-
cluding those in North Carolina, in determining whether the remedy
at law is inadequate include the difficulty and uncertainty in determin-
ing the amount of the damages; the difficulty and uncertainty in col-
lecting the damages; and the insufficiency of the money damages to
obtain a substantially equivalent performance. 89 Moreover, North
Carolina law is in accord with the generally accepted principle that
the violation of a legal right entitles a party to at least nominal
damages.1 90
It is a basic principle of contract law that damages are compensa-
tory and not punitive.1 91 The most obvious application of this princi-
ple is the general exclusion of punitive damages in a breach of
contract cause of action.1 92 However, the doctrine of mitigation is also
premised on this view. Consequently, an injured party who fails to
take reasonable steps to mitigate following a breach of the contract
will not be allowed to recover for any losses that could have been
avoided. While scholars and commentators point out that the injured
party is not required to mitigate, the language in the opinions com-
monly refers to mitigation as a requirement by the injured party.1 93
As a practical matter, the outcome is the same whether the mitigation
is characterized as mandatory or voluntary, in that the injured party
will not be allowed to recover for losses that could have been avoided.
The expectation interest, which is most commonly applied by the
courts, falls short of its stated purpose to make the injured party
whole due to the exclusion of certain types of damages from the re-
covery. Attorneys fees, for example, are generally not recoverable in
a breach of contract cause of action unless specifically provided for by
statute.1 94 Additionally, the doctrines of certainty and foreseeability
can also operate to limit the injured party's recovery. In American
Lumber Co. v. Quiett Mfg. Co., the court stated the generally recog-
nized view with respect to the requirements of certainty and foresee-
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359; Moore v. Moore, 252 S.E.2d 735 (N.C.
1979).
189. Whalehead Props. v Coastland Corp., 261 S.E.2d 899, 908 (N.C. 1980); Bryson v. Peak,
43 N.C. 310 (1852) (The court enunciated the widely-recognized view that in a breach of contract
for the sale of land, an injured party can elect for specific performance and is not bound to bring
an action at law for damages.).
190. Delta Envtl. Consultants, Inc. v. Wysong & Miles Co., 510 S.E.2d 690, 698 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1999).
191. Chapel Hill Cinemas, Inc. v. Robbins, 547 S.E.2d 462, 470 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15 (d) (WESTLAW through 2004 Legis. Sess.): "Punitive dam-
ages shall not be awarded against a person solely for breach of contract."
193. Harris & Harris Constr. Co. v. Crain & Denbo, Inc., 123 S.E.2d 590, 598 (N.C. 1962).
194. Delta Envtl. Consultants, Inc., 510 S.E. 2d at 695 (The court stated that the principle was
well-settled in North Carolina that no attorneys fees, whether as costs or as an item of damages,
are recoverable in the absence of statutory authority.).
2004]
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ability when it stated that damages which are certain and must have
been reasonably contemplated, are recoverable for a breach of con-
tract, but damages that are purely speculative are not recoverable.' 95
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES
A contract, being voluntary and consensual by its nature, creates
rights and obligations with respect to those parties who are bound by
a contractual relationship. As a general matter, parties outside of that
relationship acquire no rights with respect to the enforcement of the
transaction, nor are they subject to obligations issuing from the trans-
action. The Third Party Beneficiary doctrine stands as a major excep-
tion to this principle. Although the leading case on the Third Party
Beneficiary doctrine is a New York case, Lawrence v. Fox, which was
decided in 1859,196 the North Carolina Supreme Court had recognized
the doctrine several years earlier in Cox v. Skeen.197 Under the Third
Party Beneficiary doctrine, parties outside the contractual relationship
may acquire certain rights against parties within that relationship de-
pending upon their status as an "intended" beneficiary or an "inciden-
tal" beneficiary. 198 An incidental beneficiary is, in essence, any
beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary, and acquires no right
to performance from the contracting parties.199 Traditionally, in North
Carolina, third parties who were not in privity with a professional
were treated as incidental beneficiaries and not permitted to recover
in an action against the professional.2"' However, in United Leasing
Corp. v. Miller, the court of appeals stated that it had re-examined its
position since Chicago Title and held that a non-client could bring an
action against an attorney for negligently certifying title to prop-
erty."0 ' Initially, the Restatement of Contracts further classified in-
tended beneficiaries as "donee" beneficiaries where the purpose of
the promisee in obtaining the promise of a performance was to make
195. American Lumber Co. v. Quiett Mfg., 78 S.E. 284 (N.C. 1913).
196. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859) (The court upheld the promise by a debtor to the
creditor to repay the debt to a party to whom the creditor was indebted even though that indi-
vidual was not a party to the transaction between the debtor and the creditor.).
197. Cox v. Skeen, 24 N.C. 220 (2 Ired. 1842).
198. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 10.1.
199. See, e.g., Reidy v. Macauley, 290 S.E.2d 746, 748 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (The court held
that a real estate broker was an incidental beneficiary to a contract between a vendor and pur-
chaser and thus was not entitled to maintain an action for breach of contract against the
purchaser.).
200. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, 244 S.E.2d 177, 181 (Where a non-client general contrac-
tor brought legal action against an attorney for the attorney's alleged negligent certification of
title, the court held that "[alt most, [the appellant] was merely an incidental beneficiary who
acquired no rights by virtue of the contract .. ").
201. United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 263 S.E.2d 313 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); see also Title Ins.
Co. of Minn. v. Smith, Debnam, Hibbert & Pahl, 459 S.E.2d 801 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
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a gift to the beneficiary, and "creditor" beneficiaries where the prom-
isor's performance satisfied a duty of the promisee to the benefici-
ary.2 °2 This classification was expressly adopted by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in 1970 in Vogel v. Reed Supply Co. 03 Al-
though the "donee" and "creditor" distinctions were eliminated in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts in favor of the use of the terms
"intended" and "incidental" beneficiaries, the test for determining in-
tended beneficiaries remained the same:
[U]nless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a benefici-
ary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to
performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the inten-
tion of the parties and either (a) the performance of the promise will
satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary;
or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance .... 4
Consequently, the impact of the terminology change has been
minimal.2 °5
Courts have adopted different approaches with respect to specific
applications of the Third Party Beneficiary doctrine. One recurrent
area in which these differences are manifested is that of lawsuits
against attorneys for malpractice by parties outside the attorney/client
relationship. Courts differ on whether these causes of action should
be based in tort or contract, and whether they should be permitted at
all based upon concerns of imposing potentially unlimited liability on
attorneys. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has since abandoned
its position in Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Holt, where it earlier rejected
the view that such actions are grounded in tort and declined to permit
an indemnitor to bring a breach of contract action against the attorney
as a third party beneficiary of the contract.20 6 Another recurrent area
of disagreement among the courts centers on the liability of a party
who contracts with a governmental entity. The typical case involves a
recipient of services that were rendered improperly by a party who
contracted with a governmental entity to deliver those services. A
202. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932).
203. Vogel v. Reed Supply, 177 S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1970).
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
205. Reidy v. Macauley, 290 S.E.2d 746, 747 ("Although the 1979 Restatement eliminates
the 'donee' and 'creditor' categories in favor of a new designation-'intended beneficiaries'-it
nevertheless classifies all other beneficiaries as 'incidental beneficiaries'.... Thus, the 1932 Re-
statement test for determining third party beneficiaries remains the same under the 1979 Re-
statement. Moreover, the Vogel test for determining if one other than the contracting parties has
legally enforceable rights has not been changed by our courts .... "); see generally, Hoisington v.
ZT-Winston-Salem Assoc., 516 S.E.2d 176 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Harry G. Prince, Perfecting the
Third Party Beneficiary Standing Rule under Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, 25 B.C. L. REV. 919, 990-997 (1984).
206. United Leasing Corp., 263 S.E.2d at 313.
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leading case on this issue is H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.
20 7
In that case, a water company that had contracted with the city to
furnish water at the hydrants was sued by the owner of a business that
was destroyed by fire because of the company's failure to maintain
adequate pressure at the hydrants. The owner of the business alleged
that he was a third party beneficiary of the contract between the city
and the water company. While the court in that case acknowledged
that, in the broadest sense, every contract entered into by the city was
for the benefit of its residents, it distinguished between services the
city chose to provide and those the city was obligated to provide, and
concluded that this service fell into the latter category. Consequently,
the plaintiff in that case had no standing to bring the action against the
water company as a third party beneficiary.2 °8
The decisions in these cases are driven primarily by public policy
considerations where the courts are concerned that imposing wide-
spread liability on companies that do business with governmental enti-
ties would discourage them from doing so. Although the courts in a
majority of the jurisdictions are in agreement with Moch, North Caro-
lina cases depart from this view and hold that an action can be main-
tained. Potter v. Carolina Water Company is one such case. Potter was
factually similar to Moch in that it also involved a company that failed
to maintain adequate pressure at the fire hydrants in violation of its
contract with the city. In Potter, however, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court cited a long line of cases giving injured citizens a right to
maintain an action against a private company for its breach of contract
to supply water to a municipality for fire protection.20 9
CONCLUSION
North Carolina case law and statutory provisions are generally in
line with contractual principles as they are applied in a majority of
jurisdictions. There are few areas in which the state's courts have
clearly aligned themselves with a minority position. Where no distinct
majority or minority view has emerged, the cases reflect a reluctance
on the part of the courts to depart from their past positions. Relying
on the principle of stare decisis, and citing the salutary need for cer-
tainty and stability, the courts prefer to reiterate their approval of
principles enunciated in prior decisions. In those instances where the
courts have evinced a willingness to depart from established case law,
or where the courts are faced with a question of first impression, they
tend to moderate their position through analogies and distinctions of
207. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer, 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
208. Id.
209. Potter v. Carolina Water Co., 116 S.E.2d 374, 377-378 (N.C. 1960).
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prior decisions. Consequently, the current status of the law as it has
evolved to date does not distinguish North Carolina in the emergence
and transformation of contractual doctrines.
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